This article describes a statistical method for aggregating the information 
published, most of which received considerable attention in newspapers and on television.
More opinion polls do not automatically imply better information for the public, journalists, parties and researchers. Pollsters use di erent approaches and are therefore likely to report di ering results, not just due to random sampling error, but systematic, long-term di erences due to design choices. This paper describes the Irish Polling Indicator, a method for aggregating the information contained in opinion polls, taking into account both random error and systematic di erences between the polls. It builds on earlier work in, among others, Australia, Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom (Jackman, 2005; Fisher et al., 2011; Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan, 2016; Walther, 2015; Cantu, Hoyo and Morales, 2015) and extends this to the Irish case, which has a comparatively high number of political parties (compared to Canada and Australia) and a relatively modest volume of polls (compared to the United Kingdom).
In addition, the paper discusses how major events that arguably shock public opinion can be better incorporated into poll aggregation models. This is particularly relevant for the Irish case, which has seen major economic challenges that a ected people's party preferences at short notice.
The aim of the Irish Polling Indicator is twofold. First of all, by aggregating opinion polls for each parliamentary term it provides a historical time series of party support that can be used in political research. While in anecdotal accounts of election campaigns and governance, opinion polls seem to play a regular role, political scientists have relatively recently begun to look at their impact on policy-making in a more structural fashion (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Pickup and Hobolt, 2015; Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008) . While opinion poll data are available for Ireland, it is somewhat scattered and concerns individual polls only (ISSDA, 2015; Marsh, 2006) . Existing approaches to pooling opinion polls have focused on campaign polls only (McElroy and Marsh, 2008) . Secondly, opinion polls are regularly reported in news media, with strong conclusions based on non-signi cant poll changes featuring all too often. Poll aggregation makes systematic di erences between polling companies visible and stresses the uncertainty associated with these estimates.
Two Types of Error in Opinion Polls
Opinion polls are a classic example of using a sample to learn something about a population. We are not interested in the political views of 1000 randomly selected individuals as such, but we ask them for their opinions as this can tell us something about the beliefs of the whole population. This does not mean that every sample will be exactly re ective of the population, as any introductory text on statistics will point out. Often two types of error are distinguished: random and systematic error (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 63) .
Random error varies between samples drawn from the same population. An important source of random error is sampling error. Because Irish opinion polls are usually limited to around 1000 randomly selected people we might, just by chance, encounter a higher percentage of Fine Gael voters among our thousand than there are in the population as a whole. If we would repeat the sampling procedure the random error is likely to be somewhat di erent. When using simple random sampling, the size of this source of error is known, or to put it better: the Central Limit Theorem informs us that the sampling distribution will be approximately normal. Sampling error is often presented as the sole source of error in the polls ('the margin of error'), but it only covers only random error due to sampling. Moreover, the usual equations for calculating random error are only valid when each member of the population has an equal chance of being sampled and these probabilities are independent. The Irish pollsters that use face-to-face interviewing generally limit the number of physical locations of eldwork ('sampling points') to 64 (Millward Brown), 100-125 (Behaviour & Attitudes) or 120 (Ipsos), interviewing between 10 and 15 people in each location. 1 In the past the number of sampling points was lower (and the number of interview per location higher). This introduces clustering in the sample and without correction the standard errors of estimated statistics will be underestimated (Kish, 1957; Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009 ). On the other hand, post-strati cation can reduce the standard error, especially if the weighting variables are strongly related to the variable of interest. For example, if we know that women are more likely to support Labour and we have accurate data about the percentage of women in the population, we can correct for any random under-representation (or over-representation) of women in the sample. E ectively, the standard error for weighting variables will be reduced to zero.
As a result, variables that correlate highly with the weighting variables, will also show less variability than under simple random sampling. All in all, it is more di cult to estimate the size of the random error in real-world examples, because of the complications of the research design as well as other factors that may increase random error, such as data entry errors, incomplete coverage, non-response, refusal to participate in the survey and weighting procedures. The di erence between random sampling error and the total random error in a certain poll is sometimes called 'pollster-induced error' or the 'design e ect' .
Systematic error, or bias, potentially presents a larger problems for opinion surveys. While random error can largely be addressed by taking larger samples, systematic di erences between sample and population remain, no matter how large the sample. The often cited example of Literary Digest, which used a heavily biased sample of car owners and telephone users to -incorrectly -predict a Republican landslide in the 1936 US presidential election, is a case in point. The sample was huge (they sent out 10 million ballots; 2.3 million returned), but contained a disproportional number of high-income voters who favoured the Republican candidate. Moreover, these Republicans were more likely to respond than the Democrats in the sample adding further bias (Squire, 1988) . Systematic error will remain even if a new sample is drawn, while random error has an expected value of zero (it averages out across many samples). Unfortunately there are many potential sources of bias, such as an incomplete sampling frame and non-response. Moreover, people tend to overstate their likelihood to vote, which means that not all respondents will be actual voters (Crespi, 1988, 74) . It is di cult to assess how large any systematic error is. Most pollsters apply (post)strati cation weights based on demographic variables, such as sex and age. While this is non-controversial, we know that these variables o er only a partial explanation for the variation in political behaviour and hence samples that are perfectly representative in terms of demographics may still be seriously biased with regard to other variables (Brüggen, Van den Brakel and Krosnick, 2016) . Sometimes adjustments are made based on past experience. Some Irish pollsters used to weight down Fianna Fáíl scores, which they seemed to overstate. Currently, polling company Red C Research weights the data halfway between intended voting behaviour and recalled voting behaviour in the previous election, assuming that people may overstate change in party preference in polls. Behaviour & Attitudes weights based on previous voting behaviour and likelihood to vote. Millward Brown and Ipsos MRBI currently do not apply such adjustments (other than excluding don't knows), although Ipsos has done so in the past.
As we lack a 'golden standard', it is impossible to judge which approach is the best. Even if we know what might have worked in previous elections (in terms of observing a small di erence between the nal polls and the election outcome), there is no guarantee that the same approach will work again. The recent elections in the United Kingdom re ect this very strongly (Mellon and Prosser, 2015) . What we can make visible is that there are systematic di erences between pollsters. Some pollsters have a consistently higher estimate for certain parties, compared to other pollsters. This is important to take into account when interpreting data from new polls. Poll aggregation provides a way to take into account random error from polls by treating them as somewhat noisy signals as to true party support at a moment in time.
Moreover, we can estimate systematic di erences between pollsters, so-called house e ects.
A Statistical Model for Aggregating Polls
Over the past decade or so, political scientists have developed models to aggregate information in individual opinion polls (Jackman, 2005; Fisher et al., 2011; Walther, 2015; Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan, 2016; Cantu, Hoyo and Morales, 2015) . Here, I present a variation of those models that is particularly suited to the Irish multi-party case. This model is applied to each parliamentary term separately to allow parameters, for example the ones that model systematic di erences between polling companies, to di er between terms.
The rst part of the model describes what each poll tells us about the state of the party. In particular, the model assumes that the proportion of support for party p in poll i is the sum of the 'true' party score on the day d that poll i was held (A pd i ) and the 'house e ect' for pollster b who did poll i (H b i ), plus some random sampling error.
Under simple random sampling, the standard error s ip for a party score in a poll can be estimated as
. As Irish pollsters generally use a more complicated design to select participants, especially in face-to-face polls, I account for the sampling error being smaller or larger than expected under random sampling by a factor D, which is estimated in the model. 2 Combining this, I model each party's score in each poll as drawn from a normal distribution with a mean equal to the 'true' party score and the poll's house e ect and a variance equal to that expected under random sampling times a 'pollster-induced error' measure 3 :
where the variance parameter s 2 ip is calculated from the data (where n i stands for the size of poll i):
We are of course, most interested in the estimation of the 'true' population score for each party. The model allows us to take into account both systematic and random error. The systematic error is part of the 'house e ect', which is assumed to be constant across a parliamentary term. 4 The random error is captured in the second part of the formula, s 2 ip D. This model is similar to the one used by Jackman (2005), Fisher et al. (2011) and Walther (2015) . Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan (2016) use a multinomial distribution to model the number of supporters for each party in a poll, which is probably a more elegant approach than the normal approximation to the binomial distribution used here. The downside is that they are unable to incorporate 'pollster induced error' and therefore have to assume that each poll's error is equal to 2 Ideally, this parameter would be allowed to vary between pollsters. In practice, however, if this is allowed, the model tends to estimate a tiny design e ect for the most popular pollster, resulting in an estimate that very closely follows the polls of that particular pollster. Pickup et al. (2011) report similar issues. Therefore I estimate a single industry-level design e ect. 3 In the mathematical notation I will specify the variance of the normal distributions. The JAGS script in the appendix uses the precision, which is the inverse variance. 4 As Ipsos MRBI changed its adjustment method during the 1997-2002 and the 2007-2010 term, we split these terms into multiple parts (three and two respectively) (Marsh and McElroy, 2003, 163) . For each part, we estimate the house e ects separately (each subject to the zero-sum constraint discussed below). that under random sampling. 5 The second part of the model describes how party support changes from day to day, using a 'random walk model' or 'Kalman lter' (Jackman, 2005) . This assumes that party support can change somewhat from day to day, but is unlikely to jump up and down greatly on a daily basis. This allows the model to infer which polls are likely to be outliers. Most previous work has modelled party support today as a function of party support yesterday plus or minus a certain amount of change (Jackman, 2005; Fisher et al., 2011) . In a multi-party setting one should, however, ensure that the total support for all parties equals 100 per cent on any given day. I implement the approach taken by Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan (2016) , who model the random walk over the log-ratios of party support (LA pd ), with the rst party acting as the reference party with a log-ratio of zero. For all other parties:
The parameter τ 2 p is estimated from the data. I use a party-speci c value of tau, as some parties are more changeable than others. Moreover, because the random walk is taken over the log-ratios, we would expect τ 2 p to be much larger for very small parties (with large negative log-ratios) than for parties that are equal in size to the reference party (log-ratios close to zero).
To calculate the estimated vote share for each party from these log-ratios, the following formula is used:
This approach ensures that all estimated vote shares will be larger than 0, and also ensures that the total sum of vote shares equals one. 6
The house e ects are constrained to average zero across pollsters. That is, we assume that the average pollster does not deviate from the true population mean. In that sense, this is an aggregation of polls and not an attempt to correct for any 'industry bias'. Thus, if all pollsters overestimate a certain party, so will the aggregation of polls. 7
5 Moreover, the implementation of the model is more di cult as the software used to estimate this model, JAGS, does not allow for missing values in the vector of counts.
6 I also experimented with non-logged ratios, but this requires the implementation of a truncated normal distribution in the random walk model, which means that the algorithm runs less quickly. The results, however, were rather similar to the log-ratio approach.
7 An alternative approach is to set A 0 to the prior election result and assume that di erences between that election and subsequent polls are due to house e ects . This strategy has the advantage that it allows us to correct for 'industry bias', that is under-or overestimation of a party by all pollsters. The problem is, however, that relatively few polls are done after an election. In the Irish case this is particularly true, with sometimes a few months passing between elections and the rst post-electoral poll. One solution would be to x the parameter A n , where n is the last day observed, to the subsequent election result (Jackman, 2005) . This option is, of course, only feasible for historical data, not the current term. Moreover, one has to assume that the day-to-day change is similar in the nal stages of the election In the Bayesian implementation of the models, the following priors are used 8 :
3 Data
Polling data were collected from a number of sources. For the most recent periods, The aggregation procedure detailed above was applied separately to each parliamentary term. In each term all parties that were regularly included in the breakdown of party support are included in the model. 9 Minor parties, which were only somecampaign compared to the entire period; this assumption might not necessarily hold. 8 Strictly speaking, the house e ect prior is over the unstandardized house e ect. Also note that the prior for the variance of the random walk is over τ p rather than τ 2 p . 9 If a party's support was not included in the breakdown of only a few polls, for these polls the party support (as well as support for 'others') was de ned as missing. One advantage of the aggregation model times reported, were included in the 'other' category. If a party entered the frame in between elections, its starting position was assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution between -10 and 10 on the log scale (LA d ); beforehand, its support was xed at 0. If a party ceased to exist in between elections, its support was xed at 0 for the remainder of the term. For example, after the Progressive Democrats disbanded in 2008, it was no longer included in any polls and its support was xed at 0 in the aggregation model. I used the polls' headline gures, which are often 'adjusted' to some extent, that is, don't knows were excluded, the data were weighted for demographic variables and in some cases also for prior voting behaviour. There is a practical reason for doing so, which is that the unadjusted data was not always available, but there is also a substantive reason. For most of the research questions of interest, we would be interested in party support in polls as reported at the time. While it is a worthwhile academic exercise to arrive at retrospectively improved measures of support (using unadjusted gures), if we want to use polling numbers to explain the behaviour of political actors, we should work with the data available at the time. If the point of the model is to make an accurate forecast of subsequent elections, one might nd that it is better to work with unadjusted gures, although this is not a given. This is, however, not the ambition here. Rather, I aim to give an accurate summary of the polls. If all pollsters overestimate a certain party and this is reported in the media, we might expect that actors respond to this (biased) result rather than true levels of party support, which would be unknown to them. Similarly, if we want to inform people better about the current state of public opinion, one can choose to forecast the election result, making adjustments for any industry bias that might exist in polling data. This approach has been successful in the United States, although equally re ned models failed to capture dynamics in the 2015 British elections (Silver, 2012) . A more moderate goal is to better inform the public about the current state of opinion polls.
This involves taking into account random error of polls and systematic di erences between pollsters without correcting for any industry bias that might exist. These models come with the obvious caveat that if all pollsters are wrong, the aggregate will also underestimate or overestimate a particular party. On the upside, one has to make fewer assumptions about corrections for industry bias, which often depend on historical patterns. The aim of the Irish Polling Indicator is to inform people about the information contained in opinion polls, not to forecast the election.
The model is estimated in JAGS (Plümmer, 2013) , a software package for Markov Chain Monte Carlo estimation. The JAGS scripts are included in the Appendix. I run three chains, with 30,000 burn-in iterations and 60,000 iterations each (thinned by a factor of 150). While there is a large degree of autocorrelation between the iterations, above, estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods is that it allows for exibility regarding missing values. Even though the aggregation model proposed in this paper is not intended as a forecast model, observers might be interested to see in the di erences between nal estimates and general election outcomes. After all, if an aggregate of polls would bear no resemblance at all with the nal outcome, perhaps we should advice voters and parties not to pay much attention to them. Figure 3 displays the Polling Indicator estimate on the day before a general election (in black) and the outcome of that election in grey. In a large majority of cases, the election result falls within the cred- While this does imply that predictions from the polls do contain error and likely also bias for certain parties, overall the aggregation of polls does give a fair indication of how parties will do on election day. On average, the aggregate of polls deviated from the election result by between, on average, 0.73 per cent (2011) and 1.99 per cent per party (2016). In most cases that is clearly better than the poorest poll and quite close (or even better than) the best poll.
Systematic and Random Error
The aggregation model takes into account that there are systematic di erences between pollsters, so-called house e ects. The house e ects reported here are to be interpreted Apart from the systematic di erences between pollsters, the aggregation model also takes into account that the random error associated with poll estimates may be 5 1987−1989 1989−1992 1992−1997 1997−2002 2002−2007 2007−2011 2011−2016 Note: values indicate how many times larger the con dence intervals of individual poll estimates were estimated to be, compared to random sampling. A value of 1 would mean that the random error associated with the polls would be exactly the same as under random sampling. Larger values indicate that more error is associated with the poll estimates (error bars represent 95% credible intervals).
larger (or smaller) than under random sampling. In all but one of the terms studied, this 'design e ect' or 'pollster-induced random error' factor was indeed larger than one, suggesting that polling estimates were more variable than to be expected under random sampling (see Figure 5 ). This is not unexpected as many pollsters use a limited number of sampling points for their face-to-face interviews. As a result, there is an element of clustering in the sample, which should increase the standard error somewhat. It is, however, di cult to be entirely sure of the size of this e ect.
First of all, low polling volumes make it di cult to estimate this e ect very precisely, with the prior distribution on parameter D a ecting the estimates. In the most recent term, however, poll estimates were also be found to show more variability than is to be expected under random sampling, while for this period we do have a relatively large sample of polls (and the prior distribution has much less e ect on the ndings).
Therefore, we can be reasonably sure that pollster-induced error does play a role in the Irish case with error margins likely to be somewhat underestimated by the simple formulas used for the case of random sampling.
Incorporating Shocks Into Poll Aggregation Models
Poll aggregation models are good at distilling trends from (noisy) polling data. When one new poll with remarkable outcomes is published, one's response should be 'it is only one poll', and that is exactly how aggregation models treat these polls. Information from the new poll is compared to previous polls. If the new poll is somewhat higher than the polling average, even correcting for house e ects, it is much more likely to be just noise than represent a 'real' trend. Thus, polling aggregation models dampen outliers and are generally somewhat conservative about 'breaking polls'. While this is generally a good approach, in certain situations it might lead the aggregation models to underestimate change. If a party drops ve percentage points in the polls after a major corruption scandal, that is much more likely to represent a true e ect than if the same change happens after the party was not in the news at all. In other words: if there is prior information about important political events that should a ect our beliefs as to whether drops or increases in party polls represent true e ects.
The random walk model used in the model above allows party support to change more on some days than on others. Still, change is estimated to be relatively small from day to day. This is true for most days, but there are major political events that seem to 'break through the random walk'. Mid-term elections and important societal events, such as the Bank Guarantee in Ireland in 2008, are examples. After such events, party support might change dramatically overnight. Such change might be so extreme that the random walk parameter does not represent it very well.
The proposed solution here is to modify the random walk model, by multiplying τ p by a factor γ s :
where s represents the instance of shock, with s = 1 representing the normal random walk and s = 2, 3, ..., n representing days with major political events:
E ectively this means that on 'shock days' support for a party is allowed to make a much bigger step in the random walk than on normal days. As γ s is estimated in the model, it is not necessary that there will be a large change in party support on those 'shock days': if polls before and after the 'shock day' are stable, γ s will be estimated to be (close to) unity. If there is a large change in polls, however, the γ s parameter makes it much more likely that this is interpreted as real change rather than a large outlier in the polls. This is reasonable, because our knowledge about relevant political circumstances indeed tells us that changes in party support around the time of the 'shock day' are likely to be real.
Ireland 2008-2010
The The modi cation suggested above seems to be able to capture sudden changes in party fortunes better than the normal speci cation. The good news for polling aggregation methods is that after some time, both the 'normal' and 'shock' measures converge. Still, if one is interested in the impact of one speci c important political event on party support, the 'shock' modi cation seems appropriate as not to underestimate changes in public opinion in the short term.
We can further analyze the e ect of the two major economic events on Fianna
Fáil support by replicating the analysis in Marsh and Mikhaylov (2012) . Table 1 ). The Adjusted R squared for their model is 0.83 with a root mean squared error of 3.3. They nd a strong e ect of both the Bank Guarantee and
Withdrawal from the bond market on Fianna Fáil support.
I replicated the analysis using the 'shock model' time series presented above. 12 Because this model presents an estimate of party support for each day, rather than using each month as a case, I used daily data. To allow for an easy comparison between the models, my time variables are expressed in (fractions of) months as well.
The main ndings are very similar between models (see Table 1 ). I nd a large impact of the Bank Guarantee on Fianna Fáil support in the slightly longer run. Although the immediate e ect of the Bank Guarantee was estimated to be just over 4
per cent, levels of support for Fianna Fáil declined further to a much lower level after the Bank Guarantee. This e ect is estimated to be almost 12 percentage points. The
Withdrawal from the bond market also a ected Fianna Fáil support negatively, by about 3.7 percentage points, according to Model 2. Moreover, I nd negative time trends after the major economic events. The model t for this daily time series is very good (R 2 ad j = 0.96), which is even higher than the Marsh & Mikhaylov model. 13 One explanation might be that the aggregation model presents less 'noisy' indicators of party support in polls than individual polls do; therefore, it would be easier to explain the variance in that support using structural explanations. 14 13 This is also true (R 2 ad j = 0.96) when we limit the model to one observation per month resulting in 66 monthly observations. 14 I also replicated the Marsh & Mikhaylov model using the original Irish Polling Indicator series. Findings are similar except for Withdrawal from bond market, which loses signi cance. This seems to support the case for taking into account major events when modelling opinion polls.
6 Discussion: Using Poll Aggregation To Improve Me-
dia Reports of Opinion Polls
The results show that both random error and systematic di erences between pollsters should be taken into account when interpreting opinion poll results. This is exactly where poll aggregation can be used to improve media coverage of opinion polls. The rst lesson to be taken from this would be that reports on opinion polls should take account of all available polls, not just those from one company that did the most recent poll. The Irish Polling Indicator makes house e ects, systematic di erences between pollsters, explicit. Part of the explanation why a party might do particularly well in a poll might be that it always does better in polls by that pollster. Even when media outlets report in detail about a speci c poll commissioned by them, they should not prove blind and deaf to the information contained in other polls. They help to interpret the results: is this increase for a party likely to represent true change, or might it just be random noise? It would of course be even better to report the results of poll aggregation models alongside with individual polls. This puts the individual poll into context and shows that random and systematic error should be taken into account.
The second lesson is to take account of uncertainty associated with polls. While most academics are at ease when dealing with uncertainty, it sometimes seems to irk journalists and the general public. This all too often leads to one of two responses:
either to forget about uncertainty altogether and interpret all changes in polling support as real or to argue that polls tell us absolutely nothing because of all that uncertainty involved. This black and white view of opinion polls does not do justice to their usefulness. While Irish media do quite often include basic relevant information about opinion polls, such as when the poll was taken, the number of respondents and the associated margin of error, sometimes the description of the results does not take account of the disclaimer. Regularly, small di erences between parties and small changes in parties' fortunes are interpreted as 'true', while these are quite likely to represent random error ('noise'). Many media could do a better job at reporting uncertainty margins associated with polls. Data from the Irish Polling Indicator is very suitable for this aim. The Bayesian speci cation of the models allows for an intuitive understanding of the uncertainty (credibility intervals) associated with the estimates.
It is easy and correct to report that 'according to the Irish Polling Indicator, we are 95% certain that support for Fine Gael lies between 25 and 29 per cent'. 15 Moreover, it is possible to directly estimate the probability that a party saw its support increase or decrease compared to one week or month ago, as the Polling Indicator produces Reports of individual polls should, more than is the case now, focus on this added value. This way polling aggregation and results from individual polls can be combined to provide better insights into voters' preferences.
Conclusion
This article presented a poll aggregation method for Irish election that has the potential to inform voters better about parties' political fortunes. It tackles the challenge of aggregating opinion polls in a multi-party setting with a limited number of polls outside election time, especially before 2007. This contribution is particularly relevant for voters and political actors in Ireland, who may use the results to gain a better understanding about strengths and limitations of opinion polls. In comparative terms, the model presented here combines various insights in opinion poll aggregation. It moves beyond the two-party case by modelling support for all parties together, ensuring that support sums to 100 per cent (Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan, 2016) . At the same time, it incorporates house e ects as well as an estimate of design e ects, which makes explicit that random polling error is usually larger in the Irish case than under simple random sampling . Finally, it presents a way to incorporate shocks to the political system into the model. This makes poll aggregation more useful in cases where we want to estimate the e ect of an event on party support. Further work is, however, necessary to explore the consequences of the proposed 'shock' adjustment in other settings.
Work on the Irish case could be extended in multiple directions. First, one could use these estimates as a starting point for estimating the number of seats each party stands to win Hanretty, Lauderdale and Vivyan, 2016) . Because of the complications of the Single Transferable Vote system in small multi-member constituencies and the importance of vote transfers, this would require additional data and modelling regarding the geographical distribution of party support as well as transfer patterns between parties. Second, one could move from an aggregation model of opinion polls to a forecast model of elections. To do this, one needs to take into account historical patterns of polling bias, as well as the additional error involved in projecting current polls onto election results in the future. Work on this in the United States and the United Kingdom has achieved a high level of sophistication, which could be used to pursue a similar enterprise in Ireland. While election forecasting per se should perhaps not be a primary aim of academic political science research, these studies help us to understand biases and uncertainty in polling better and thereby help to contribute to a better understanding of opinion polls by parties, journalists and hopefully the general public.
